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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Schiavo case burst onto the national scene most people
assumed that everyone would see the case as they did. This proved
incorrect, however; what had seemed settled was in fact unsettled. Schi-
avo showed everyone that American pluralism is alive and well regard-
ing life-sustaining treatment decisions. Schiavo also demonstrated that
at least some of this pluralism reflects misguided myths about human
life and death. Although different beliefs and values underlie the myths,
each myth supplies comforting but false notions about death and dying.
Schiavo also revealed how poorly prepared we are for the imminent
aging of the Baby Boom generation. As a nation, we are about to expe-
rience a significant demographic event. We can expect a large rise in
the number of older individuals facing physically and mentally debilitat-
ing conditions. Many will depend on medical interventions for survival.
Decisions about extending life will be more common than ever, but
neither our culture nor our legal system is ready to cope. And, as long
we hold fast to our myths, we will remain unready.
In this Article, I examine three myths that Schiavo exposed. The
first myth is that death with dignity is easily attainable in modem
America, so long as people make living wills. The second myth is that
only patients themselves are permitted to take quality of life into account
when making life-sustaining intervention decisions. The third myth is
that research advances are bringing an end to the difficulties of aging.
* Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of Law and Professor of Ethics in Medicine, Washington
University in St. Louis.
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According to this myth, medicine will soon offer ways for us to live
longer and better, and then to die quick, comfortable deaths. Schiavo
was a harsh reminder that none of these myths reflect reality.
To examine the myths, I draw on the Schiavo public commentary
that has emerged from various individuals and groups. I also draw
extensively from four texts published in 2005, the year the Schiavo case
made headlines. Two of the texts are memoirs. Joan Didion's The Year
of Magical Thinking' recounts her experiences as the wife of someone
who died suddenly and as the mother of someone with an unexpected
and prolonged life-threatening illness. Marjorie Williams' Hit by Light-
ning: A Cancer Memoir2 describes facing terminal illness as a mother of
young children and as a writer at the height of her career. The third
book is Ray Kurzweil's The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Tran-
scend Biology,3 which belongs to a genre offering utopian visions of a
scientifically-enhanced future. Kurzweil predicts that humans will soon
triumph over biology in ways that will reverse aging and defeat disease,
allowing people to live as long as they desire. Fourth is a report from
the President's Council on Bioethics, Taking Care: Ethical Caregiving
in Our Aging Society.4 I am part of the group that prepared this report;
not surprisingly, I think it offers a realistic, although unsettling, picture
of what we face.
Together with the Schiavo commentary, these texts illuminate con-
temporary American thinking about death and dying. In Part I of this
Article, I describe how myths about dying influenced perceptions of
Terri Schiavo's situation. In Part II, I discuss how the four texts cited
above both express and challenge the myths. Part III argues for replac-
ing the myths with a medical system more responsive to the needs of
patients and society. This system would place less emphasis upon
advancing the frontiers of medicine and more emphasis upon delivering
humane and decent care to all patients. In a system setting high-quality
care as a first priority, doctors and other clinicians would have more
time to speak with patients and families and to provide people the care
that they need.
II. MYTHS SCHIAVO EXPOSED
Public scrutiny of the Schiavo case brought to the forefront certain
1. JOAN DIDION, THE YEAR OF MAGICAL THINKING (2005).
2. MARJORIE WILLIAMS, Hit by Lightning: A Cancer Memoir, in THE WOMAN AT THE
WASHINGTON Zoo 307-39 (Timothy Noah ed., 2005).
3. RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY Is NEAR: WHEN HUMANS TRANSCEND BIOLOGY
(2005).
4. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, TAKING CARE: ETHICAL CAREGIVING IN OUR AGING
SOCIETY (2005) [hereinafter TAKING CARE].
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cultural themes about death and dying. As the controversy played itself
out, previously unrecognized background beliefs became explicit fea-
tures of the Schiavo narrative. Although not everyone embraced each
one of these beliefs, each belief was defended by a vocal constituency.
A. The Living Will Myth
The absence of a living will was at the heart of the Schiavo dispute.
The Florida courts relied on testimony about the patient's former con-
versational remarks because there was no formal written or oral advance
directive.5 Terri Schiavo had been raised a Roman Catholic.6 But, it
was unclear whether she agreed with church teachings on forgoing med-
ical nutrition and hydration.7 This ambiguity about her beliefs left room
for her husband and parents to make contradictory claims about her
treatment preferences.
At the national level, Schiavo became a cautionary tale about what
can happen when patients neglect to make living wills. Commentators
urged members of the public to complete the necessary documents to
prevent similar personal disasters.8 In turn, news accounts reported
increased interest in living wills from individuals "acting to avoid the
type of situation that has torn apart the family of Terri Schiavo."9 Many
referred to Schiavo's "beneficial side effect," which was that "[p]eople
across the ... nation are talking about, and, more important, writing in
living wills instructions for their own final days."' 0 USA Today reported
on an emerging entertainment venue - the living will party - and offered
tips on hosting one."
More conversation among family and friends about end-of-life care
is a welcome development, but a narrow focus on living wills as the
means to achieve a "good death" may be counterproductive.' 2 Crusades
5. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178-80 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
6. Id. at 180.
7. See id. In a 2004 statement, Pope John Paul II asserted that medical nutrition and
hydration are morally obligatory for patients in a persistent vegetative state ("PVS"). See Thomas
A. Shannon & James J. Walter, Implications of the Papal Allocution on Feeding Tubes, HASTINCS
CTR. REP., July-Aug. 2004, at 18.
8. See, e.g., Christopher J. Gearon, A Matter of Life and Death: Schiavo Case Spurs More
Americans to Weigh Living Wills, AARP BULL., Dec. 2003, available at http://www.aarp.org/
bulletin/yourhealth/Articles/a2003- 12-09-livingwill.html.
9. Id.
10. Connie Prater, Schiavo Case Increases Interest in Living Wills, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 27,
2003, at IA.
II. Janet Kornblum, Living Wills Make the Scene, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 2005, at 8D,
available at 2005 WLNR 6652811.
12. It is not even clear that a living will would have prevented the Schiavo dispute.
Disagreement between Michael Schiavo and the Schindlers about other dimensions of Terri
Schiavo's situation, such as her level of awareness and prognosis, could have made this a
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to promote living wills ignore an impressive body of empirical research
demonstrating this device's practical shortcomings.13 Despite numerous
campaigns and other promotional efforts, relatively few people issue
specific instructions about their life-sustaining treatment preferences. 4
Those who do express their preferences tend to make general statements
that often fail to resolve the actual treatment questions that later arise.' 5
Unless someone is facing a life-threatening illness with a predictable
future course, advance choices are made without the information and
understanding that characterize informed medical decisionmaking.
Finally, data suggest that relatives and clinicians disregard preferences
expressed in a patient's living will if they perceive a conflict with the
patient's current welfare. 16 Indeed, in one study a majority of partici-
pants said they wanted their living wills overridden in certain
circumstances. 17
An emphasis on living wills also neglects other elements of good
end-of-life care. Public messages seem to imply that living wills are the
primary vehicle for individuals to achieve a "death with dignity."' 8 But,
whether one receives high-quality care at the end of one's life depends
on the services and facilities one uses. In a medical system that empha-
sizes acute care, "rescue" measures, and cutting-edge science, the pallia-
tive care, support for caregivers, and other forms of low-tech assistance
that help dying patients and their families are not always available. A
living will cannot furnish a good death when care is inadequate.
In sum, living wills can be useful in helping families and clinicians
address treatment decisions. Given the complexities of medical care,
contentious case even if she had made a living will. Although living wills might reduce the
chance of a later family dispute, it is misleading to suggest that they can guarantee family
harmony about an incapacitated relative's end-of-life care. See Rebecca Dresser, Schiavo: A Hard
Case Makes Questionable Law, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 2004, at 9.
13. See James Q. Wilson, Killing Terri, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2005, at A16 ("[S]cholars have
shown that we have greatly exaggerated the benefits of living wills. Studies by University of
Michigan professor Carl Schneider and others have shown that living wills rarely make any
difference. People with them are likely to get exactly the same treatment as people without them,
possibly because doctors and family members ignore the wills. And ignoring them is often the
right thing to do, because it is virtually impossible to write a living will that anticipates and makes
decisions about all of the many, complicated, and hard to foresee illnesses you may face.").
14. TAKING CARE, supra note 4, at 71.
15. Wilson, supra note 13.
16. Id.
17. TAKING CARE, supra note 4, at 72. For extensive discussion of the issues touched on in
this paragraph, see id. at 53-93, and Angela Fagerlin & Carl Schneider, Enough: The Failure of
the Living Will, HASTINGS Cm. REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 30-42. There are ethical questions, too,
about whether a person's partially informed preferences as a healthy individual should control
future treatment as an incapacitated patient. See Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided
Strategy for Securing Death with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1823, 1837-41 (2003).
18. Wilson, supra note 13.
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however, advance instructions are seldom the sole basis for such deci-
sions. Living wills are only one component of end-of-life planning, and
planning is just one component of good end-of-life care. Thus, a narrow
focus on promoting living wills is an inadequate response to improving
end-of-life decisionmaking. To be responsive to patients and families,
state and national policies must address treatment situations' mul-
tifaceted elements without narrowly focusing on living wills.
B. The Quality-of-Life Myth
People who endorsed continuing Terri Schiavo's life-sustaining
treatment focused on the quality-of-life judgment implicit in the deci-
sion. Most physicians examining her said that she was permanently
unconscious but could live for many years if nutrition and hydration
were continued.' 9 Because she had no progressive terminal illness, the
choice to forgo treatment depended on the judgment that life in her con-
dition was not worth living. These treatment proponents found it partic-
ularly problematic that the courts would permit withdrawal of nutrition
and hydration. 0 The proponents felt that if a patient could be deprived
of these basic measures on grounds that her life was of insufficient
value, there was little to distinguish American medicine from Nazi Ger-
many's euthanasia program for people with mental disabilities.2 '
Conservative publisher and commentator William Federer defended
this position. Writing on the organization Priests for Life's Web site, he
described how Nazi mass killings first targeted people the state charac-
terized as having a poor quality of life. 2 Although Nazi doctors and
government officials claimed that the euthanasia program would relieve
patients' suffering, their actual motivations were economic and
19. See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2002 WL 31817960, at *2-5
(Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 2002) (three of five physicians testifying at the evidentiary hearing said
Terri Schiavo was in a PVS); JAY WOLFSON, A REPORT TO GOVERNOR JEB BUSH AND THE SIXTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN THE MATTER OF THERESA MARIE SCHIAVO (2003), available at http://abstract
appeal.com/schiavo/WolfsonReport.pdf.
20. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 13.
21. Id. ("What is lacking in this matter is not the correct set of jurisdictional rules but a decent
set of moral imperatives. That moral imperative should be that medical care cannot be withheld
from a person who is not brain dead and who is not at risk for dying from an untreatable disease in
the near future. To do otherwise makes us recall Nazi Germany where retarded people and those
with serious disabilities were 'euthanized' (that is, killed).").
22. William Federer, The Court-Ordered Death of Terri Schiavo, PRIESTS FOR LIFE, Oct. 17,
2003, http://priestsforlife.org/euthanasia/townhall.htm ("The Nuremberg trials, exposing the
horrible Nazi war crimes, revealed that Germany's trend toward atrocity began with their
progressive embrace of the Hegelian doctrine of 'rational utility,' where an individual's worth is
in relation to their contribution to the state, rather than determined in light of traditional moral,
ethical and religious values.").
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eugenic.23 According to Federer, the court decisions permitting with-
drawal of Terri Schiavo's feeding tube reflected a similar philosophy. 4
Writing in the Wall Street Journal, political scientist James Q. Wil-
son also saw a parallel to Nazi practices.25 Wilson said that the United
States should adopt a rule "that medical care cannot be withheld from a
person who is not brain dead and who is not at risk for dying from an
untreatable disease in the near future."26 Without such a rule, this nation
would too closely resemble "Nazi Germany where retarded people and
those with serious disabilities were 'euthanized' (that is, killed). 27
Some critics portrayed the decision to withdraw Terri Schiavo's
treatment as cold-blooded and cruel. For example, Wisconsin Congress-
man James Sensenbrenner said that forgoing nutritional support would
be "nothing short of inhumane. 28 In a similar vein, an Operation Res-
cue spokesman explained the group's protest as follows: "We're not
going to stand idly by while she is starved to death .... This wouldn't
happen to a dog; you wouldn't do it to your pet."29
Other critics emphasized that Terri Schiavo's own views on quality
of life were unclear. One such critic, former Congressman Tom DeLay,
stated, "[i]t's not for any one of us to decide what her quality of life
should be. It's not for any one of us to decide whether she should live or
die."3 DeLay was also skeptical of Michael Schiavo's claims about
Terri Schiavo's former preferences: "[U]nless she had specifically writ-
ten instructions in her hand and with her signature, I don't care what her
husband says."31
Commentator John Leo took a similar position, arguing that Schi-
avo represented a departure from previous end-of-life policies:
23. Id.
24. Id. ("Will America chose [sic] the 'sanctity of life' concept, as demonstrated by Mother
Teresa, or will America chose [sic] the 'quality of life' concept, championed by self-proclaimed
doctors of death court decisions - such as in the case of Terri Schiavo - and continue its slide
toward Auschwitz? What kind of subtle anesthetic has been allowed to deaden our national
conscience? What horrors await us? The question is not whether the suffering and dying person's
life should be terminated, the question is what kind of nation will we become if they are? Their
physical death is preceded only by our moral death!").
25. See Wilson, supra note 13.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Alisa Ulferts, Anita Kumar & William R. Levesque, U.S. House Acts to Save Schiavo, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at IA, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2005/03/17/
Tampabay/US House-acts to save.shtml.
29. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Another Hearing Set in Right-to-Die Case, WASH. PosT, Feb. 23,
2005, at A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45357-2005Feb22.
html.
30. William Saletan, Deathbed Conversion: The Lesson of Tom DeLay's Mortal Hypocrisy,
SLATE, Mar. 28, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2115879/.
31. Id.
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Once we had a bright line between pulling the plug on patients being
kept alive by life support systems and killing people like Terri Schi-
avo, who are not on life support but merely being fed through a tube.
Requiring clear evidence of consent is no longer required. In the
Schiavo case, we have vaguely remembered consent from a party
with a vested interest (the husband) some eight years after the patient
was stricken.32
These speakers and writers raised legitimate moral questions about
decisions to forgo treatment regarding incapacitated patients, but they
were disingenuous in acting as though the Schiavo case broke new sub-
stantive ground. For many years, courts and legislatures have authorized
surrogates to make just these sorts of decisions.33 Terri Schiavo was
simply the latest in a series of incapacitated patients whose diminished
quality of life was a factor in the decision to forgo life support.
Seventeen years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly addressed
the question of nutrition and hydration for another permanently uncon-
scious woman, Nancy Cruzan. 34 In Cruzan, a five-justice majority of
the Court held that the federal Constitution allows states to mandate con-
tinued life-sustaining treatment for incapacitated patients unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the patient would refuse such treat-
ment. At the same time, Justice O'Connor stated in a concurrence that
the Constitution allows states to devise more lenient rules to govern this
difficult area. 36 According to Justice O'Connor, states may permit non-
treatment when less than clear and convincing evidence exists about a
patient's previous beliefs and preferences.37 Indeed, a Missouri trial
court allowed withdrawal of Cruzan's feeding tube based on evidence
that fell short of an explicit and formal treatment refusal. 38
32. John Leo, Schiavo Scandal Indicates Low State of Bioethics, uEXPRESS.COM, Mar. 27,
2005, http://www.uexpress.com/johnleo/index.html?uc-full-date=20050327 (emphasis supplied).
33. See generally Alan Meisel, Suppose the Schindlers Had Won the Schiavo Case, 61 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 733 (2007).
34. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
35. Id. at 282.
36. Id. at 292 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. See id. ("the more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding
incompetents' liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States").
38. In his book about the case, the Cruzans' attorney describes conversations between Nancy
Cruzan and coworkers during the 1970s. Because these coworkers did not contact the family until
after the initial trial, this testimony became available only after the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling.
At the time the conversations occurred, Ms. Cruzan was working as an aide in a school for
severely disabled children. One of her duties was to care for a profoundly impaired child.
According to the coworkers, Nancy Cruzan referred to the child as a "vegetable" and said that she
would not want to be tube-fed in such a condition. On remand, the trial judge found that these
remarks constituted clear and convincing evidence that Nancy Cruzan would have chosen to forgo
nutritional support in her then-current state. See WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE
DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN 333-36 (2002).
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Cruzan and Schiavo involved patients diagnosed as completely
unaware, patients who would never be able to participate in any form of
human interaction. Legal authorities have recognized a legitimate role
for quality-of-life judgments in treatment decisionmaking for conscious
incompetent patients as well. If treatment interventions would impose
severe burdens and offer little benefit to patients, courts and legislatures
permit non-treatment. 39 Implicit in this approach is the judgment that a
painful or distressing intervention may sustain life, but may also make
that life too burdensome for the impaired individual. Rulings like this
contradict claims that the court decisions in Schiavo were deviant in
allowing quality of life to influence the treatment outcome.
At the same time, however, proponents of continuing Terri Schi-
avo's life-sustaining treatment were not the only group making question-
able assertions about quality-of-life decisions' proper place regarding
incapacitated patients. Few people defending the Florida courts' Schi-
avo rulings acknowledged the troubling aspects of allowing such judg-
ments to support end-of-life choices. This feature of the debate
disturbed both disabled persons and their families.
Disabled persons raised concerns about remarks healthy individuals
were making regarding Terri Schiavo's quality of life.n ° Disability
advocates said their experiences had helped them appreciate the value of
life with physical and mental limitations." Some said they identified
with Terri Schiavo, in that they shared what outsiders viewed as a low
quality of life.4 2 Their personal knowledge led them to question whether
Terri Schiavo was as impaired as most of the doctors said she was and
whether she would have actually supported the decision to withdraw
treatment.4 3 A societal judgment that Terri Schiavo's life was not worth
living made other disabled people fear that they were more vulnerable to
care and treatment denials.' As one advocate put it, "[a]mong the disa-
bility rights community, it is a generally heard belief that in society at
39. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985). In this case, the New Jersey Supreme
Court articulated a rule allowing life-sustaining treatment to be withheld or withdrawn if there is
some indication that the patient would refuse, and "it is clear that the burdens of the patient's
continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits of that life for him." Id. at 1232. If there
is no evidence that the patient would refuse, treatment may still be forgone if "the recurring,
unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with the treatment [is] such that the effect of
administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhumane." Id.
40. Ceci Connolly, Schiavo Raised Profile of Disabled, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2005, at A9,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/articles/A19752-2005Aprl.html.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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large the view is 'better dead than disabled."' 45
Disability rights attorney Harriet McBryde Johnson presented an
especially compelling account of these concerns. 46 Johnson has a neuro-
muscular disease that will at some point require her to use a feeding
tube.4 7 This condition might also deprive her of the ability to speak.48
In contrast to many commentators, Johnson supported Congress' deci-
sion to intervene in Schiavo.49 In her view, federal court review of state
court decisions was justified.5" She argued that strong safeguards are
needed when disabled persons are unable to make their own medical
choices.5' Federal court review could help ensure that "state courts are
not tainted by prejudices, myths, and unfounded fears - like the unthink-
ing horror in mainstream society that transforms feeding tubes into fetish
objects, emblematic of broader, deeper fears of disability that sometimes
slide from fear to disgust and from disgust to hatred."52
Relatives of people with disabilities also spoke out about the qual-
ity-of-life issues. For example, law professor Marjorie Shultz com-
mented on Schiavo in light of her own experience as the mother of a
patient who recovered consciousness after three months in a vegetative
state.53 As a parent, she was dismayed at hearing her son described as
"vegetative" and disturbed by what she believed were "inappropriate
levels of certainty" exhibited by "designated experts" making the diag-
45. Id. (quoting William G. Stothers, Deputy Director of the Center for an Accessible
Society).
46. Harriet McBryde Johnson, Not Dead at All: Why Congress Was Right to Stick Up for
Terri Schiavo, SLATE, Mar. 23, 2005, http://www.slate.comid/2115208.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3,
119 Stat. 15 (2005).
50. Johnson, supra note 46.
51. Id.
52. Id. Some liberal members of Congress, such as Senator Tom Harkin, agreed with the
need for a federal review proceeding. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Lawmakers Ready to Again
Debate End-of-Life Issues, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 28, 2005, at AI, available at 2005 WLNR 4818185
("In the Senate, Tom Harkin, Democrat of Iowa, has also been consulting with advocates for
disability rights and is preparing to introduce legislation along the lines of the bill that the House
passed, a spokeswoman said. Senator Harkin, an author of the Americans With Disabilities Act,
was one of the few Democrats in the Senate who spoke in favor of the so-called private relief
measure that allowed a federal court to review Ms. Schiavo's case.").
53. Barry Bergman, An Ethical Postmortem on the Schiavo Case, BERKELEYAN, May 4, 2005,
available at http://www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/2005/05/04_schiavo.shtm ("'To me, the
import of Schiavo has to do with the difference between expert opinion about abstracted rules on
the one hand, and a more lay, intuitive, experiential, feeling-oriented sense of what is going on in
relation to a case like [Terri Schiavo's],' said [Boalt Hall Professor of Law Marjorie] Schulz,
observing that 'the public at large did not much participate' in the conversations that supposedly
'settled' key bioethical questions."').
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nosis.5 4 She also questioned claims that there was a clear consensus on
ethical approaches to treating vegetative patients. Shultz called for
more humility among clinicians evaluating brain-injured patients and
more public participation in bioethics discussions about acceptable treat-
ment decisions for patients like Terri Schiavo.56
Much of the public commentary surrounding Schiavo fell into one
of two extremes: either (1) condemning or (2) endorsing the role of qual-
ity-of-life judgments in end-of-life decisions. A few writers, however,
expressed reservations about each extreme. For example, columnist
William Raspberry wrote:
We might agree as a matter of law that the recorded wishes of the
person whose death is at issue ought to be determinative. But it
doesn't really carry us through the deeper moral questions ...
[W]hat of the guy who doesn't wish to go on living without the girl-
friend who left him? Does he have a right to die? To call on others
to help him die?... The quality of life standard, I am saying, is not
as reliable as some of us would like to believe. The question of end-
ing life - of which life is not worth prolonging - is never easy, nor
should it ever become easy.57
David Brooks of the New York Times also found fault with each
extreme. He rejected the position that quality-of-life judgments are
always inappropriate, noting that with today's technology "there are
people living forms of existence that upon direct contact do seem even
worse than death."5 8 Yet he also rejected the moral relativism implicit
in the view that individuals and families should have complete discre-
tion to decide when life is worth living: "Once you say that it is up to
individuals or families to draw their own lines separating life from exis-
tence, and reasonable people will differ, then you are taking a funda-
mental issue out of the realm of morality and into the realm of relativism
and mere taste."59
Legal authorities, too, are divided on how quality of life should
affect treatment decisions. Some courts have agreed with Tom DeLay
and John Leo that decisions to forgo treatment involving patients with
severe brain damage implicate quality-of-life judgments that must come
from the patients themselves. This was the Missouri Supreme Court's
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. William Raspberry, Editorial, Whose Life Are We Supporting?, WASH. POST, Mar. 28,
2005, at A 17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5758-2005Mar27.
html.
58. David Brooks, Editorial, Morality and Reality, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 26, 2005, at A13,
available at 2005 WLNR 4743835.
59. Id.
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decision in Cruzan,6 ° although the U.S. Supreme Court said Missouri
was constitutionally free to choose between either deferring to the
patient's wishes or allowing close family members to decide.6 1 When a
patient's previous wishes are unclear, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote,
"we think a State may properly decline to make judgments about the
'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert
an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed
against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual."62 And,
when patients are conscious, but afflicted by Alzheimer's disease,
stroke, or brain injury, several state supreme courts have demanded clear
and convincing evidence of an individual's prior wishes before allowing
non-treatment.63
The mixed rulings in these cases express our nation's ambivalence
and uncertainty about quality-of-life judgments' proper place in treat-
ment decisions concerning patients incapable of independent choice.
Although clinicians and officials commonly acknowledge that quality of
life plays a role in decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment, the
acceptable boundaries of this role remain uncertain. To develop ade-
quate policies on end-of-life care for incapacitated patients, more
national debate about where to place these boundaries is necessary.
C. The Life Extension Myth
One major point of contention in Schiavo was whether medical
interventions could improve the patient's brain function. Early on, "fol-
lowing months of therapy and testing," Michael Schiavo took his wife to
California to try "an experimental thalamic stimulator implant in her
brain."'  Afterwards, they returned to Florida where clinicians contin-
ued "regular and aggressive physical, occupational, and speech ther-
apy."65 Apparently, all of these measures were ineffective, and Terri
Schiavo's failure to improve contributed to her husband's conclusion
that continued life was of no value to her.
Terri Schiavo's parents, on the other hand, wanted to continue the
search for an effective treatment, and certain physician-entrepreneurs
reinforced the wisdom of this search. At a 2002 hearing, two physicians
60. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
61. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 286-287.
62. Id. at 282.
63. See generally Rebecca Dresser, The Conscious Incompetent Patient, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
May-June 2002.
64. WOLFSON, supra note 19, at 9.
65. Id.
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testified that further treatment interventions could help this patient.66
Each physician claimed he could provide Terri Schiavo with therapy that
would "significantly improve her quality of life."67 One doctor said that
Terri Schiavo could benefit from hyperbaric therapy. 68 But, three other
physicians said they had never referred brain-injured patients in Terri
Schiavo's condition for this treatment and predicted it would have no
effect.69  Another physician-witness described an intervention called
vasodilatation therapy that he offered on a fee-for-service basis at a
clinic he operated.7° However, as the judge noted, that form of interven-
tion "is not recognized in the medical community."'" No witness could
produce case studies or other published reports suggesting that
hyperbaric or vasodilatation therapy would benefit a patient with Terri
Schiavo's medical problems.
Like Terri Schiavo's parents, others opposed to withdrawing treat-
ment seized on claims that additional intervention could improve her
condition. For example, John Kilner, President of the Center for
Bioethics and Human Dignity, argued, "[i]f life truly is precious, then
therapies that might make a significant difference ought to be tried
.... ,72 Jay Wolfson, the guardian ad litem charged with reporting on
the Schiavo litigation to Florida Governor Jeb Bush, observed:
In recent months, individuals have come forward indicating that there
are therapies and treatments and interventions that can literally re-
grow Theresa's functional, cerebral cortex brain tissue, restoring part
or all of her functions. There is no scientifically valid, medically
recognized evidence that this has been done or is possible, even in
rats .... It is imaginable that some day such things may be possible;
but holding out such promises to families of severely brain injured
persons today may be a profound disservice.73
Sensationalism about both alternative therapies and early-stage lab-
oratory discoveries makes some people reluctant to rule out the possibil-
ity that patients will recover despite a dismal prognosis. Faith in
medical miracles is nothing new, but today's journalists and scientists do
66. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GB-003, 2002 WL 31817960, at *2 (Fla. 6th
Cir. Ct. Nov. 22, 2002).
67. Id. at *3.
68. Id. For a description and discussion of hyperbaric therapy, see Michael Neumeister,
Hyperbaric Oxygen Therapy, eMEDICINE.COM, July 21, 2005, http://www.emedicine.comiplastic/
topic526.htm.
69. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2002 WL 31817960, at *4.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. John Kilner, The Schiavo Controversy: First Things First, CTR. FOR BioEmics & HUMAN
DIGNITY, Mar. 24, 2005, http://www.cbhd.org/resources/endoflife/kilner-advancedirective_2005-
03-24_print.htm.
73. WOLFSON, supra note 19, at 31.
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a lot to foment such faith. Vulnerable patients and families hear reports
of lifesaving cures on the horizon, and this only adds to their preexisting
hopes for an escape from death.74 Media and Internet-based claims
about unproven interventions involving stem cells, gene therapy, and the
emerging field of "regenerative medicine" create a fertile environment
for beliefs akin to those the Schindlers entertained regarding their
daughter, Terri Schiavo.75
The myths about living wills, quality of life, and miracle cures
shaped public perceptions of the Schiavo case. Writers and speakers
brought their preexisting views to bear in their Schiavo commentary.
Unfortunately, much of the commentary perpetuated misconceptions
about end-of-life care in contemporary America. In this sense, the Schi-
avo public debate had a detrimental impact on the nation's attitudes
toward death and dying.
III. OTHER PORTRAITS OF DEATH, PRESENT AND FUTURE
Commentary on the Schiavo case was just one piece of a larger
body of American literature on death and dying. In 2005, other writers
offered their thinking on these topics, including some who were contem-
plating human mortality from widely different vantage points. These
writers were influenced by the same myths that influenced the Schiavo
debate, but for the most part, they also displayed a deep and rich under-
standing of medicine and the meaning of death.
A. Joan Didion's The Year of Magical Thinking
Joan Didion delivered a searing account of what it was like to lose
her husband, John Gregory Dunne, to heart disease. At the beginning of
her book, she implied that her husband's death was unexpected, "a sud-
den massive coronary event."'76 Didion described with breathtaking
immediacy the shock of the sudden death: "Life changes fast. Life
changes in the instant. You sit down to dinner and life as you know it
ends."77
Gradually, however, Didion revealed that she had many warnings
of her husband's impending death. The heart disease was not new and
her husband had a pacemaker implanted the previous year. Later, she
74. See generally REBECCA DRESSER, WHEN SCIENCE OFFERS SALVATION: PATIENT
ADVOCACY AND RESEARCH ETHICS 129-50 (2001).
75. Indeed, stem cells were "discussed at great length" at the 2002 Schiavo hearing, although
the judge noted that "one of the few agreements between these experts is that stem cell research is
currently at the experimental stage and is years away from being accepted either medically or
politically." In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2002 WL 31817960, at *3.
76. DIDION, supra note I, at 7.
77. Id. at 3.
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recalled that as long ago as the 1980s,78 his doctor told him that he "was
a candidate for a catastrophic cardiac event."79 Indeed, his condition
was labeled "the widow-maker."80 Although he underwent angioplasty,
he predicted that the condition would eventually kill him.8' But, until
his death, Didion had "[e]ither ...not remembered this or ...had
determinedly chosen not to remember this."82
Her husband also tried to prepare her for his death. "He believed
he was dying. He told [her] so, repeatedly. [Didion] dismissed this."83
In short, the threat of her loved one's death was there all along - as it is
for everyone to some degree. But, like many of us, Didion found that
threat impossible to accept.
Didion also helps us to understand why she - and we - avoid fac-
ing death. The grief is unbearable. Without sugarcoating or resorting to
euphemism, she described real grief.84 Real grief is paralyzing; it has
intense physical effects.8 It is so overpowering that "magical thinking"
occurs.8 6 Didion found herself "thinking as small children think, as if
[her] thoughts or wishes had the power to reverse the narrative, change
the outcome."87 For example, on the night of her husband's death, she
"needed to be alone so that he could come back."88
Grief imposed another burden on Didion, the belief that she should
have done something to prevent this catastrophic event. After her hus-
band's death, she was "increasingly fixed on locating the anomaly that
could have allowed this to happen."89 Later, she realized, "[she] was not
however operating from [her] rational mind."90 During this time, Didion
was coping with a second family tragedy, her only child's serious and
ultimately fatal illness.91 She felt somehow responsible for this disaster
as well. In this case, she had failed to act as a parent should. Didion
eventually realized that her "basic promise" to her daughter was in fact
"a promise [she] could not keep. [She] could not always take care of her
[daughter]."'92
78. Id. at 147-48.
79. Id. at 155.
80. Id. at 157.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 155.
83. Id. at 78.
84. Id. at 26-28.
85. Id. at 27-28.
86. Id. at 33.
87. Id. at 35.
88. Id. at 33.
89. Id. at 204.
90. Id. at 205.
91. See id. at 83-88.
92. Id. at 96.
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Didion also portrayed the social separation that comes with grief.
After her husband died, she felt "invisible" to most of the world: "[She]
seemed to have crossed one of those legendary rivers that divide the
living from the dead, entered a place in which [she] could be seen only
by those who were themselves recently bereaved. 93
Didion did not have the luxury of disappearing, however, for she
still had to watch over her severely ill daughter. Rather than attempting
to cross into Didion's world of grief, many of the people she knew
offered her their "management skills."9 4  These people, she wrote,
"believed absolutely in the power of the telephone numbers they had at
their fingertips, the right doctor, the major donor."95 Yet Didion herself
saw that managing this crisis was impossible; that what she was endur-
ing was largely out of her hands. Because she was "born fearful," she
knew intuitively that "some events in life would remain beyond [her]
ability to control or manage them. Some events would just happen.
This was one of those events."96
Didion's story is full of raw pain, but it offers wit and irony as well.
These emerge most often in her criticism of the medical system. For
example, she noted that her daughter, Quintana, received a new drug
called Xigris for septic shock.9 7 A nurse told Didion that the Eli Lilly
drug cost $20,000.98 Curious about the medication, Didion went to the
Internet. There she found a reported survival rate of 69% for sepsis
patients given Xigris and a 56% survival rate for patients given other
interventions.99 Didion also found a business report on Xigris, which
"said that Eli Lilly's 'sleeping giant' was 'struggling to overcome its
problems in the sepsis market.'"100 To Didion,
[t]his seemed in some ways a positive prism through which to view
the situation: Quintana was not the child who had been a deliriously
happy bride five months before and whose chance of surviving the
next day or two could now be calibrated at a point between 56 and 69
percent, she was "the sepsis market," suggesting that there was still a
93. Id. at 75. In this discussion, Didion referenced a classic work by historian PHILIPPE
ARIIS, WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH: FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE PRESENT (Patricia
M. Ranum trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1974). Aries examined a shift that occurred during
the 1930s; before that time, death was accepted as part of ordinary experience. Didion writes,
quoting Aries, that after that period death was transformed into an unusual, "shameful and
forbidden" event. DIDION, supra note 1, at 60. In turn, grief was increasingly seen as a private
matter, not to be imposed on others. Id.
94. DIDION, supra note 1, at 98.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 65.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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consumer choice to be made.' 0 '
Didion also noticed odd gaps between everyday language and the
way clinicians talk. One day, for example, a physician's assistant told
her that he was encouraged about Quintana's condition. 10 2 When the
worried mother, eager for good news, asked why, he explained that he
had not expected Quintana to be alive when he came in that day. 10 3 In
the midst of Quintana's surgery, a doctor emerged to deliver the good
news that the team expected her to "leave the [operating] table.""' 4 But,
this confused Didion: did they mean that Quintana would be alive when
she left the table? 10 5
The Year of Magical Thinking touches on many dimensions of the
Schiavo controversy, but in a separate 2005 piece, Didion directly
addressed the case. Of course, she saw the case through the lens of her
own ordeal. Two of her comments are noteworthy. First, Didion won-
dered about the significance of Terri Schiavo's former statements about
life-sustaining treatment, some reportedly made while watching a televi-
sion movie. Didion wrote:
Imagine it. You are in your early twenties. You are watching a
movie, say on Lifetime, in which someone has a feeding tube. You
pick up the empty chip bowl. "No tubes for me," you say as you get
up to fill it. What are the chances you have given this even a passing
thought? 10 6
Second, Didion called for more openness about the quality-of-life
questions underlying the Schiavo controversy. In her view, the central
moral argument in the case, "whether, when it comes to life and death,
any of us can justifiably claim the ability or the right to judge the value
of any other being's life[,] remained largely unexpressed."' 7 Didion
criticized the opposing sides for engaging in name-calling and other
forms of intolerance, instead of confronting the core question, which
"had ultimately to do with whether.., there could be occasions when
the broad economic and ethical interests of the society at large should
outweigh any individual claim to either the most advanced medical
attention ... or indefinite care.' 0 8
In sum, Didion's position was that remarks about a future state of
101. Id.
102. Id. at 66.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 92.
105. Id.
106. Joan Didion, The Case of Theresa Schiavo, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, June 9, 2005, available
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18050.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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illness constitute a limited and, in some cases, an uninformed attempt to
gain power over events that are often unmanageable. More broadly,
nature imposes severe limits on our ability to control how and when we
die. Didion refused to turn a blind eye to the quality-of-life judgments
others inevitably make in decisions about how to care for incapacitated
patients. Didion also demonstrated that while extended life spans may
be fun to dream about, people today cannot avoid the painful reality that
their loved ones will die, that they may die in horrible, unpredictable
ways, and that there is no escape from this almost unbearable fact. And
she beautifully expressed how difficult it can be for a parent to experi-
ence and accept losing a child.
B. Marjorie Williams' Hit by Lightning: A Cancer Memoir
Marjorie Williams was a well-respected journalist who died of liver
cancer in 2005. After her death, her husband edited a collection of her
essays, including a previously unpublished piece on her four-year expe-
rience with terminal illness. Williams used down-to-earth terms to
describe what it was like to confront mortality. At first, she "felt
weirdly like an actor in a melodrama."' ° 9 There were highs and lows in
this melodrama. After her diagnosis, she enjoyed thinking of the
upsides: no taxes to pay, no Department of Motor Vehicle hassles, no
coping with teenaged children. She wrote, "I won't have to be human,
in fact, with all the error and loss and love and inadequacy that come
with the job. I won't have to get old."" Williams also had a few sur-
prisingly practical reactions. She purchased a new car, but registered it
in her husband's name so that any future sale would be easier for him.' '
She requested a cheaper version of some recommended dental work
because "it would be foolish to sink four thousand dollars into ... infra-
structure at this point."'' 2
But, most of her thoughts were about the basics of human exis-
tence. She spent her time doing the "lonely work" of "facing my death
and loving my life.""' 3 She was thankful for "the chance to rise and rise
to life's generosity.""' 4 And yet she also felt bitter toward the people
around her who were blissfully unaware of how and when they would
die. "I resent you," she wrote, "for the fact that you may never even
109. WILLIAMS, Hit by Lightning: A Cancer Memoir, in THE WOMAN AT THE WASHINGTON
Zoo, supra note 2, at 320.
110. Id. at 323.
111. Id. at 321-22.
112. Id. at 322.
113. Id. at 323.
114. Id. at 322.
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catch sight of the blade assigned to you."' '" Sometimes, she was simply
gripped by "horror, that most elementary thing."' 16
Williams' discussion of hope is complicated and full of apparent
contradictions. She reported "nurturing a garden of eleven or twelve
different varieties of hope." ' 17 One hope was unrealistic: to attain the
cure that the medical evidence ruled out. Because of that hope, she
"never thought of refusing treatment." ' 8 That hope also impelled her to
criticize certain physicians for being so insistent about her dismal prog-
nosis and to praise the one doctor who was willing to talk about prog-
nostic error.' 19
Her hope to beat the odds also drove her to use personal connec-
tions to secure appointments with top physicians. She felt guilty about
this for she knew that other people would not have these options. At the
same time, she asserted, "when your own time comes you will pull
pretty much every string available to get what you need."' 2 ° She also
noted that her contacts were not always effective because a lot of other
cancer patients were attempting to pull the same strings. When her hus-
band asked one doctor whether she could access a promising experimen-
tal drug, the doctor responded that there was no chance. "This is
Washington. Everyone thinks they can be the exception," the doctor
said. "But the lists for the kind of treatment you're talking about are ten
thousand long. "121
Williams refused to relinquish her "right to hope for the best,"' 122
but she also refused to count on a miracle. She turned down an aca-
demic physician who tried to "sell me on a phase I clinical trial from
which I couldn't possibly profit."'' 23 She declined because her optimism
had to have some basis in reality: "I don't want to end my life in some
hospital barfing in the name of science. I mean it: I want to be realistic
about what's happening to me."'124 She was furious at people who sug-
gested that she would live, feeling that they were dismissing her hard-
won progress in accepting her death. Williams admitted to harboring
unrealistic hope, but she also wrote, "[f]orced into a corner, I'll choose
truth over hope any day."'' 25
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 323.
118. Id. at 335.
119. Id. at 337.
120. Id. at 324-25.
121. Id. at 332.
122. Id. at 337.
123. Id. at 326.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 338.
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Williams had high praise for some of her doctors, especially the
ones who became her advocates:
There is nothing like having a doctor who really cares about you -
who can cut through the inhuman pace of medical time, which usu-
ally leaves patients begging to hear their test results, waiting too
many days for an appointment, at a loss until the conveyor belt brings
along the next hurried intervention.126
Yet like Didion, Williams was confused and enraged by the actions of
other clinicians. Williams relayed a chilling account of her missed can-
cer diagnosis, due to a mix-up in laboratory test results. 27 She also
pointed out that there are many improper things to say to a seriously ill
person and that for her, some of the most appalling remarks came from
healthcare professionals. 128
These encounters made Williams skeptical of doctors, and her feel-
ings even affected her political views. She noted that she did not trust
2004 presidential candidate Dr. Howard Dean because of his profession.
"Where else but in medicine," she asked, "do you find men and women
who never admit a mistake? Who talk more than they listen, and feel
entitled to withhold crucial information? Whose lack of tact in matters
of life and death might disqualify them for any other field?"' 29
Williams also wrote about her mother's death, and in another essay,
she wondered about the wisdom of seeking complete control over dying.
She recognized that her mother had an "easy" death, but wrote that
"even this short, kind end was excruciating to be a part of."' 130 The pain
came because this "crucial passage .. .was so entirely beyond our
control." 3'
Though the lack of control was agonizing, Williams doubted
whether more control would make things better. In contemplating the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide, she began to wonder if human
beings can really be trusted with the suggestion that there are ways to
make the process manageable, to combat the losses of autonomy and
control that are the essence of death. "You bear the unbearable, in the
orbit of a loved one's death, because you have to. If we come to believe
that we and our families can sometimes be spared that, how many of us
will be willing to endure it at all, under any circumstances?"' 3 2 Wil-
liams refused to condemn individuals desperate enough to resort to
126. Id. at 317.
127. Id. at 324.
128. Id. at 336.
129. Id. at 346-47.
130. Id. at 248.
131. Id. at 249.
132. Id.
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active measures, but she also opposed laws that permitted such mea-
sures: "[O]fficially, publicly, in the open realm where our norms
develop, I hope we continue to honor the assumption that death is the
one matter that is out of our hands."' 13
3
Williams told a brave and brutally honest story about seeking a
good and dignified end to her life. She mentioned her mother's living
will, but said nothing about having one herself. Instead, her death plans
focused on practical concerns, such as "whether, with children so young,
I was entitled to die at home."' 3 4 She was realistic and practical, but at
some level she also hoped for a miracle in the face of impossible odds.
For her, death and dying were bearable because she took on the tough
psychological work of facing her mortality and because she had the care
and support of loved ones and some good doctors. And, though she did
benefit from modern medicine, living more than three years longer than
the doctors first predicted, much of it was "wasted by the boredom and
exhaustion and enforced stillness of treatment."' 35
C. Ray Kurzweil's The Singularity Is Near:
When Humans Transcend Biology
In his book, Ray Kurzweil presented quite a different vision of
human mortality. Kurzweil is one of a collection of futurists who have
recently announced that we are on the verge of enjoying a vastly
extended life span. 13 6 Some of the progress will come from the new
field of "regenerative medicine," which enthusiasts say will allow peo-
ple to obtain replacement tissue when aging impairs proper human func-
tioning.' But Kurzweil predicted more spectacular achievements than
do many of his colleagues. According to Kurzweil, we are on the verge
of the "Singularity," when "the pace of technological change will be so
133. Id.
134. Id. at 334.
135. Id. at 331.
136. Stephen Hall describes people holding similar views in his work MERCHANTS OF
IMMORTALITY: CHASING THE DREAM OF HUMAN LIFE EXTENSION (2003). But see S. JAY
OLSHANSKY & BRUCE A. CARNES, THE QUEST FOR IMMORTALITY: SCIENCE AT THE FRONTIERS OF
AGING 212 (2001) ("Futurists and prolongevity advocates claim that it is only a matter of time
before aging and all of its accompanying diseases, disorders, and infirmities will be a thing of the
past. They maintain that every person is born to be healthy; disease is a product of modem
civilization and decadent lifestyles; and aging is just another disease waiting to be conquered.
Have the prolongevists of today, with their vitamin supplements, hormones, and spirituality, really
discovered the Fountain of Youth? Both history and science suggest that they have simply
rediscovered the same old false claims and misleading promises used throughout history to exploit
the desire of people to find youth in a bottle.").
137. For a discussion of these predictions, see PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN
CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY 65-70 (2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/
cloningreport/index.html.
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rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly
transformed." 3
8
This transformation will usher in incredible changes for human-
kind. Kurzweil wrote that the "Singularity will allow us to transcend...
limitations of our biological bodies and brains. We will gain power over
our fates. Our mortality will be in our own hands. We will be able to
live as long as we want .... ,,139 According to Kurzweil, revolutionary
advances in three fields will produce the changes. 40 First, discoveries
in genetics are already enabling scientists to both understand and manip-
ulate human biological processes."'4 As a result, Kurzweil claimed, "we
are starting to learn to reprogram our biology to achieve the virtual elim-
ination of disease, dramatic expansion of human potential, and radical
life extension."'14 2 Kurzweil predicted that successes in gene therapy,
therapeutic cloning, and drug and vaccine development will offer many
opportunities to reverse aging.
43
The second source of progress will involve medical applications of
nanotechnology. In a few decades, Kurzweil predicted, physicians will
be able to use nanobots, "small robots . . . that can travel inside the
bloodstream," to "perform a broad variety of diagnostic and therapeutic
functions."' 14 4  The third major advance will involve both
nanotechnology and artificial intelligence. 45 Kurzweil expressed a
belief that these combined technologies will enable us to preserve the
information that constitutes our identity and transfer it to a new home,
one that could be either biological or non-biological.146 He believed that
''we will [eventually] gain the means of 'backing ourselves up' (storing
the key patterns underlying our knowledge, skills, and personality),
thereby eliminating most causes of death as we know it."' 4 7
Kurzweil thought that the benefits of these revolutions were within
reach of people like him: "Sufficient information already exists today to
slow down disease and aging processes to the point that Baby Boomers
like myself can remain in good health until the full blossoming of the
biotechnology revolution, which will itself be a bridge to the
nanotechnology revolution."' 48 Because he saw "disease and death at
138. KURZWEIL, supra note 3, at 7.
139. Id. at 9.
140. Id. at 205-59.
141. Id. at 206-26.
142. Id. at 205.
143. See id. at 214-21.
144. Id. at 253-54.
145. Id. at 226-59.
146. Id. at 198-204, 323-26.
147. Id. at 323.
148. Id. at 210.
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any age as a calamity, as problems to be overcome," he was doing eve-
rything he could to battle the aging process. 4 9 This included taking 250
pills and supplements daily and six intravenous nutritional supplements
weekly. 150
Kurzweil entertained no serious concerns about the future he fore-
saw. He had ample faith in technology to solve any problems, such as
overpopulation, limited natural resources, and social inequalities in
access to life-extending measures. 15 Kurzweil saw only the upside of
the new world of human immortality; he expected that the "technology
of the Singularity will provide practical and accessible means for
humans to evolve into something greater, so we will no longer need to
rationalize death as a primary means of giving life."'
' 5 2
In the world Kurzweil envisioned, no one will face the struggles
that Didion and Williams described. The conflicts surrounding patients
like Terri Schiavo will cease to exist because such patients' neural infor-
mation will be available for downloading, thus enabling their restoration
to the people they were before their brain injuries. Such a world is
undeniably attractive, but it is so speculative that it would be unwise to
buy into Kurzweil's vision. Moreover, Kurzweil's ideas offer no
answers to the many short-term problems facing those who must decide
how and when their incapacitated loved ones should die.
D. The President's Council on Bioethics' Taking Care:
Ethical Caregiving in Our Aging Society
Rather than one person's conception of contemporary death and
dying, this report contains the views of a group of people, primarily
academic and medical professionals. 53 Taking Care begins by describ-
ing the coming demographic and social conditions that will make health
and other supportive care a societal preoccupation.' 54 Baby Boomers
are living longer than previous generations did due to modern
medicine's successes.' 5 As they age, Baby Boomers will suffer from
diseases that limit physical and mental functioning.'56 Many will face
Alzheimer's disease, stroke, and other conditions that impair cogni-
149. Id. at 210 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
150. Id. at 211.
151. See id. at 391-426.
152. Id. at 326.
153. For a list of Council members, see http://www.bioethics.gov/about/members.html (last
visited Jan. 16, 2007).
154. TAKING CARE, supra note 4, at xvii-xix.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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tion.' 57 The number of frail elderly Americans unable to participate in
medical choices will increase.
In Taking Care, the bioethics council joined other voices warning
of a social and healthcare crisis that has yet to receive adequate atten-
tion. 58 Countless individuals will need long-term care, and they will
need surrogates to make medical choices on their behalf. But our nation
lacks the healthcare facilities and programs needed to serve this popula-
tion.' 59 Because families are small and dispersed, fewer patients will
have close relatives to serve as surrogates. 60
Taking Care offers a detailed analysis of the medical decisionmak-
ing challenges we face. First, the report examines advance directives as
a means of resolving treatment for incapacitated patients.' 6 ' It summa-
rizes the justifications for living wills and then describes their practical
and ethical shortcomings. 62 A major problem is that living wills are
often too crude to supply real guidance. For most older, debilitated
patients, factually complicated treatment questions arise and those at the
bedside face a series of medical choices that cannot be resolved ahead of
time. Taking Care concludes that future care instructions can only and
should only play a partial role in decisions concerning incapacitated
patients. Instructions may be helpful in some cases, but appointing a
healthcare proxy is much more useful given the realities of illness. 163
The remainder of the report's analysis addresses the bedside decision-
making that is crucial to resolving most end-of-life dilemmas involving
incapacitated patients like Terri Schiavo. The report sets forth general
moral guidelines for such decisions and endorses a standard of "best
care for the person now here."'" This standard does not demand life-
sustaining measures in every case, but it does demand that the patient's
interests, rather than the interests of others, shape the course of care.
"Best care" is a formulation of the traditional best interest stan-
dard. 165 This standard is exquisitely fact-sensitive and depends on the
individual patient's situation. To illustrate how the best care standard
works, Taking Care applies it to seven cases involving patients with
157. Id.
158. See generally JOANNE LYNN, SICK TO DEATH AND NOT GOING TO TAKE IT ANYMORE!
(2004).
159. See TAKING CARE, supra note 4, at xvii-xix.
160. Id. at 1-51.
161. Id. at 53-93.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 53-93. Through a proxy directive, people may designate a trusted friend or
relative to make medical decisions on their behalf in the event that they become incapacitated. Id.
at 58.
164. id. at 128.
165. See id. at 64-67; Dresser, supra note 17, at 1842-44.
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dementia. 66 In most cases, the best care standard does not point to one
answer, but rather to a group of resolutions that appear more defensible
than others. The report's major contribution is that it attends to the
moral and practical details of appropriate end-of-life care. Rather than
the individual patient's prior choices, treatment is usually determined by
other considerations, including the ethical duty to protect vulnerable
patients, the limits of medicine, and the realization that every human life
must end at some point. 67
E. Learning from the Texts
Each of these rich accounts offers much insight regarding health-
care and life-sustaining treatment. Didion and Williams showed us how
hard it can be to let go of one's own life or the life of a loved one. They
also confronted us with their terrible isolation and the shock and pain
death imposes. As these gifted writers demonstrated, our cultural denial
of death makes it difficult for sick and grieving people to find a home
among the living. The constant effort to exclude death from ordinary
life leaves many of us inexperienced, awkward, and inadvertently cruel
when we encounter people facing mortality.1 68
Kurzweil engaged in a popular form of death denial - the belief
that science will rescue us from nature's limits. In his view, nature once
forced us to accept those limits, but with advances in science this will
soon change. We will only have to face debilitation or death when we
are very old, and even then we will have the option of downloading
ourselves into new and healthy physical containers. Taking Care pours
cold water on these ideas, pointing to the dire situation we will face in
the coming decades. It will soon be impossible to ignore this situation.
Our failure to prepare now could have serious consequences for Baby
Boomers, their families, and those who supply their care and financial
support.
166. See TAKING CARE, supra note 4, at 151-202.
167. See id. at 103-18; id. at 226 (personal statement of Rebecca Dresser).
168. One journalist described the situation as follows:
Has there ever been a time when we were less equipped to acknowledge illness and
loss? For a culture that is largely in denial about such things, the book makes clear
that "I know how you feel" is not a helpful consolation. You don't know how the
other person feels. The conversation isn't about you. And a sick or dying person
should not have to deal with lies, competitiveness or an exaggerated sense of
catastrophe. Yet the speaker unaccustomed to empathy will have no better idea of
what to say.
Janet Maslin, Open Mouth, Remove Boorishness: A Guide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2005, at E6,
available at 2005 WLNR 20453985 (reviewing MARGARET SHEPHERD WITH SHARON HOGAN, THE
ART OF CIVnIzED CONVERSATION (2005)).
[Vol. 61:821
2007] SCHIAVO AND CONTEMPORARY MYTHS ABOUT DYING 845
IV. GIVING UP OUR MYTHS
What is wrong with the myths that shaped the national perceptions
of Schiavo? What is wrong with believing that: (1) living wills will
"solve" the death with dignity problem; (2) only patients themselves
may consider quality of life in life-sustaining treatment decisions; and
(3) medical advances in the coming decades will eliminate the end-of-
life challenges that human frailties now generate?
The problem with these myths is that they produce a variety of
harms. They mislead people about the value of living wills and other
forms of advance planning. Planning strategies can be useful, but their
benefits are limited. As Didion, Williams, and the President's Council
revealed, access to high-quality healthcare - including life-extending
therapies, palliative care programs, and skilled and sensitive clinicians -
is adequate end-of-life care's key component. By focusing on the indi-
vidual's right or duty to express future treatment preferences, the Ameri-
can debate neglects the wider medical and social investments necessary
to enable patients and families to cope with the inevitable burdens that
accompany serious illness and dying. Without such services, there will
be limited opportunities to respect the wishes expressed by patients and
by their surrogate decisionmakers. In the absence of a decent care sys-
tem, living wills offer empty promises about the individual's ability to
obtain a personally acceptable death.
Didion and Williams also demonstrated how the three myths foster
a cultural denial of death and isolate people who have no choice but to
confront their own, or a loved one's, mortality. Again, the emphasis on
advance planning implies that those at the bedside can avoid hard
choices about which interventions an incapacitated patient should
receive. Yet those choices must always take into account the patient's
existing situation, including pain, distress, and ability to benefit from
continued life. These are quality-of-life considerations that can rarely be
avoided. Public debates must acknowledge this element of bedside deci-
sionmaking. Prospective patients and their loved ones must be aware
that quality of life will play a role and that quality-of-life choices are
often quite difficult. All too often this component of end-of-life care
remains hidden, and families are unprepared and overwhelmed by the
burdens it imposes.
The myths contribute to a third harm as well. The belief that
human mortality can somehow be mastered and fully controlled pro-
motes inattention to serious policy issues facing this nation. As long as
Kurzweil's attractive philosophy maintains its stronghold on the Ameri-
can psyche, there will be a tendency to focus on advancing medical fron-
tiers rather than improving the current care system for existing and soon-
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to-be patients. Instead of making the policy and cultural changes that
are needed to develop adequate end-of-life services, American resources
will be disproportionately devoted to cutting-edge cures and pie-in-the
sky anti-aging endeavors. To continue this trend would be a mistake.
Legal and policy officials can and should do more to reduce the
harm that comes from these myths. First, legal authorities should stop
suggesting that living wills and other individual planning can do most of
the hard work in resolving end-of-life dilemmas. Second, the Schiavo
controversy revealed a lack of consensus on the proper boundaries of
quality-of-life judgments. To fill this gap, courts, legislatures, and
policymakers should attempt to articulate proper boundaries for the
quality-of-life judgments that are acceptable in end-of-life care. As Tak-
ing Care and other scholarship suggests, this will require further devel-
opment of the best interest approach to decisions about life-sustaining
treatment for incapacitated patients. Third, policymakers should pro-
mote more realistic public discussion of the potential for future cures
and treatment improvements. They should urge journalists, scientists,
and clinicians to make clear distinctions between preliminary research
findings and proven medical therapies.
The debate over Schiavo created an opportunity for members of the
public, as well as medical and legal professionals, to reexamine common
American attitudes toward death and dying. Although the case has gen-
erated some perceptive scholarship, much of the initial Schiavo com-
mentary reinforced damaging myths about end-of-life decisionmaking.
Didion, Williams, Kurzweil, and the President's Council on Bioethics
offer a deeper understanding of the human meaning of life-threatening
illness. It is my hope that the second wave of Schiavo commentary will
focus less on the detrimental myths and more on the neglected elements
of good end-of-life care.
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